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ASCETICISM AND THE VALUE OF TRUTH IN 

THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 





From the outset of The Genealogy ofMorals, Nietzsche calls for a 
sweeping critique of traditional morality. Lamenting the absence of 
other such attempts, he undertakes an investigation into the specific 
conditions which have historically genera ted moral values and, most 
importantly, re-estimates the worth of these values whose goodness 
has hitherto been assumed to be impervious to doubt. Asceticism is 
the most sigruficant ethical ideal Nietzsche narrows in on in The 
Genealoglj ofMorals, and he devotes an entire section to its analysis; 
indeed, he has good reason to do so since, for Nietzsche, the element 
of self-overcoming is the backbone of all moral codes (Kaufmann, p. 
211-3). Suspecting a pathological perversion of the will and the 
origin of bad conscience in the Christian treatment of asceticism, 
Nietzsche traces the manifestations of this ideal and how it has 
devolved under the sway of institutionalized religion; furthermore, 
he exposes its interrelation with the will to truth and power, and 
questions its overall contribution to human existence. In this paper, 
I examine Nietzsche's genealogical inquiry into asceticism in order 
to determine whether he rejects this nation as irretdevably tainted 
through its monopolization by the Christian-moral intel'pretation. 
Asceticism may nat be inherently good, but is it necessarily and 
essentially decadent, anti-body and life-negating? I shall argue that 
Nietzsche does not abandon the ascetic practise and tha t a Nie tzschean 
re-valuation of the term can promote an opposing form of asceticism 
which departs from the traditional debilitation of the body and an 
authoritative position of centered meaning. 
In The Genealoglj ofMora Is ,Nietzsche declares that ethics are bam 
of blood, cruelty and torture. His analysiS ofWesternetliics takes us 
as far back as the very geneSis of religious practises, which he 
perceives to have been founded on a debtor-creditor relation be­
tween ancient ancestors and their descendents (GM, p. 222). Asceti-
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dsmhas its origin in the development ofthls relationship. First of all, 
pain, according to Nietzsche, was of instrumental value in forging a 
conscience out of the brute instinctiveness of an uncultivated race of 
humans. Noble rulers carved the awareness of debt and duty into the 
minds of others through torture and the sacrifice of those who 
transgressed this code of obligation. In addition, pain often consti­
tuted. in archaic civilizations, the repayment of a debt. Nietzsche 
asserts that the creditor was entitled to indulge his lust for power 
with complete license over an insolvent debtor, who offered up his 
humiliation and pain to the delight of his tormentor. The debt was 
thereby erased by the psychological "pleasure of rape" (GM, p. 196). 
However appalling these revelations may seem to us, it soon 
becomes clear that Nietzsche is not unearthing the nature of this 
sadistic contractual arrangement in order to demonstrate how far 
modern society has come subsequently in repudiating such barbar­
ity. On the contrary, Nietzsche claims that cruelty pervades and 
underlies all higher culture-the instinct to punish has not disap­
peared but only been driven inward; consequently, people are now 
ashamed to experience these urges which, bottled up inside, poison 
the once healthy human being with concepts of sin and self-accusa­
tion. Here then, is the inception of the hypocritical bad conscience 
which Nietzsche never tires of railing against; what had formerly 
beenexperienced with" the naive joy and innocence of the animal" is 
now spurned and denaturalized (GM, p. 199). The process which 
divorces the individual from his or her instinct to domina te inspires 
the repudiation of the whole realm of bodily functions and a general 
aversion to life, since life is grounded in these drives and functions. 
This radical inversion of the value of the instincts engendered the 
ascetic ideal. In one of his numerous foreshadowings of Freud, 
Nietzsche declares that "[a]11 instincts that are not allowed free play 
turn inward" (GM, p. 217); thus, under historical conditions which 
prohibited the external venting of hostility, humans thwarted and 
internalized violent urges and ascetic priests ruthlessly terrorized 
this new "enemy"-their own impulses. Nietzsche deplores this 
form of asceticism as being an ancillary principle of Christian anti­
sensual metaphysiCS. This practise encourages us to dichotomize 
spirit and body, privileging the spirit as pure, active, good and 
deriding the body as the source of all impurity, passivity and evil. 
Any moral doctrine, such as that of St. Paul, which sees only the 
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darker aspects of the passions and thus extols their annihilation, 
provides fodder for some of Nietzsche's most caustic polemics 
against Christian asceticism (GS, p.189). Nietzsche rejects the ascetic 
ideal as it is informed by the Christian bifurcation of human nature 
on the grounds that it institutes an impossibly distorted idealization 
that can never be realized; he asserts further that its sole purpose is 
to assure humans of their irremediably flawed natures and to rein­
force a blind hatred of life. Humankind's sense of indebtedness to 
God (the most ancient ancestor) is then carried to unprecedented 
extremes. As Nietzsche writes, with characteristic hyperbolic flam­
boyance, Christianized man 
stretched himself upon the contradiction 'God' and 
'Devil' as onarack. Heprojected all his denials of self. 
nature, naturalness out of himself as affirmations, as 
true being, embodiment, reality, as God ... as endless 
torture, as hell, as the infinitude of guilt and punish­
ment. In such psychological cruelty we see an insan­
ity of the will that is without parallel ... [the] will to 
poison the very foundation of things (GM, p. 226). 
Furthermore, this insane will to power which lies at the heart of the 
ascetic ideal is disguised by adherents of Christianity; Christian sects 
deny that the motivating source of asceticism is an internalized 
impulse to persecute others because this impulse is branded as 
immoral by the devotees of slave morality. Thus, the ascetic ideal is 
shroudedina moralhalowhichprevents it frombeingproblematized 
or re-interpreted. 
Following Nietzsche's analysiS in The Genealogy ofMorals, there 
is a second way in which the will to power is expressed through the 
ascetic i.deal At the beginning of the third essay, Nietzsche claims 
that the manifold deployment of this ideal suggests a deeper ten­
dency of human nature at work-the desire to stave off a void at all 
costs. He states that "[o]ur will requires an aim; itwould sooner have 
the void for its purpose than be void of purpose" (GM, p. 231). The 
ascetic ideal is seen to be intimately bound to notions of truth and the 
whole project of intellectual inquiry, even if the intellectual disavows 
the more explicit form of sensual asceticism. The ascetic ideal, then, 
also permeates the will to truth, which in tum actuates philosophical 
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interrogation. The intellectual mode of asceticism veils the constant 
sense of a chaotic meaninglessness which lies beneath the seemingly 
airtight categories of truth, identity andunity-the chaos that threat­
ens to explode the apparently substantive nature of these notions. 
Nietzsche maintains, somewhat paradoxically, that even those 
academics who consider themselves atheists andanti-ascetics are, in 
fact, the unwitting vehicles of the ascetic ideal in its most purified 
form. He writes, "the intellectual stoicism which in the end re­
nounces denial quite as strictly as it does affirmation ... spell[s] 
asceticism every bit as much as does the renunciation of sensuality" 
(GM. pp. 287-8). In other words, the philosopher or scholar may 
disengage him or herself from metaphYSical debates in the realiza­
tion that traditional categories of meaning fail to accommodate the 
world of becoming; nonetheless, this philosophical restraint is in­
spired by precisely the same force (the will to truth) as is the belief in 
substance and unity. The scholar who prudently withholds judge­
ment in the face of the now-recognized enigmatic nature of existence 
still, at bottom, retains the beliefin the diametrical opposition of truth 
and falsehood, and esteeming the truth ab ove all else, is driven by the 
desire to avoid error. The relentless will to comprehend the essence 
of reality yields, at last, the notion that there is no such essence to be 
comprehended; thus, the Christian exaltation of "tw.th" turns back 
upon itself and destroys its own ethic (GM, p. 297). The will to truth, 
then, is another form of the ascetic ideal, and this will mitigates our 
fear of the void by positing attainable truth as its aim, even when this 
truth is non-truth or absence of truth-evenwhenwe have banished 
the dogmatic trappings of substance philosophy. 
Intellectual asceticism is related to priestly asceticism in its 
determination to impose meaning on human existence. While the 
ascetic priest tries to eradicate the passions which chain him to the 
temporal world, this very attempt fortifies those chains byproviding 
a meaning and direction for his life as well as the life of his commu­
nity. From his violent denunciations of the earth spring a reason for 
the continuation of life, much as the scholar's sl.lspension of judg­
ment in the hopes of attaining truth in non-truth perpetuates his or 
her lust for truth. In a sense, then, both forms of asceticism serve an 
instinct for self-preservation. Although the ascetic ideal intensifies 
suffering and propagates illusions, in doing so it makes existence 
tolerable because it interprets suffering and masks those illusions as 
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truths. Thus, the willing of unconditional truth (as a means of 
sustaining life) seems to be a process Nietzsche might approve of, 
since he wouldbe the last to counsel a suicidal resignation to despair. 
However, on the very last page of The Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche cuts the bottom out of any reading of the ascetic ideal 
which renders it ultimately life-affirming. He writes, 
this whole process ofwilling ... this hatred ofhuman­
ity, of animality, of inert matter; this loathing of the 
senses ... this longing to escape from illusion. change. 
becoming. death, and from longing itself ... signifies ... 
a will to nothingness, a revulsion from life, a rebellion 
against the principle conditions of living (GM,p. 299). 
Although Nietzsche's genealogical pathnow seems highly inconsis­
tent (first, the ascetic ideal was seen as the source of bad conscience, 
then as an expedient survival-mechanism and finally, as a reaction 
against life), Nietzsche, in the end, is indicating what lies beneath the 
will to truth and the ascetic ideal; after all, Nietzsche never asserts 
that life itself is the ultimate goal of the human spirit. Indeed, while 
asceticism may have the immediate result of warding off suicide by 
"spreadingoverexistence the blandishments of illusion" (BT, p. 108), 
if completely realized, its final culmination is death, its deepest 
motive is the annihilation of all existence. Being a principle which 
rigidly excludes other interpretive systems, the ideal reveals itself as 
being the most extreme expression of the will to power. If error is a 
necessary condition of life (and Nietzsche believes it is). then the 
search for absolute truths, truths untouched bychange, sin orhuman 
failing. must be promptedby a more fundamental drive than that of 
self-preservation-it must arise from the desire for power. To want 
to gaze on the bare Medusa-face of in-itself reality, to unveil the 
naked Urstoffe of the cosmos is to desire petrifaction~ it is to desire the 
impossible-the shedding of one's own particular, finite, subjective 
point of view and the mind-body aggregate tha t makes thought and 
curiosity possible. To want to tear ourselves out of the web of 
becoming to get a glimpse at what lies "beneath" or "behind" its 
oscillating illusions is to desire that utmost power and the end of all 
becoming-death. Therefore, Nietzsche successfully fleshes out the 
claim which launches the third essay; the claim that the will would 
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sooner have death (the void) as its aim and purpose than lack a 
purpose. 
Thus, at the end ofThe Genealogy ofMorals, are we left to assume 
that. thanks to Nietzsche, asceticism has been once and for all 
debunked, devalued, exposed as aninclination one would do well to 
avoid? Are we justified then in abandoning ourselves to hedonistic 
dissipation and forgetting about philosophy? Not unless Nietzsche 
has undergone a complete apostasy, for his works abound in pas~ 
sages inwhich he reviles the whole notion of eudaemonistic laisser 
alles. Repeatedly he heaps derision upon those who would escape 
from suffering, bury their heads in the sands of ignorance and 
acquiesce to a lukewarm, "go-with-the-flow" mentality. Letting 
oneself go and submitting indiscriminately to every whim certainly 
does not pave the way to greatness for Nietzsche. Nothing worth~ 
while at any level of culture has ever been attained without the 
expense of ruthless sacrifice. 
Furthermore, the will to truth as expressed through the ascetic 
ideal is also not entirely discarded. Again, throughout Nietzsche's 
workshe makes it clear that he holds the uncompromising search for 
truth and "the desire for certainh} ... [to be] that which separates the 
higherhumanbeings from the lower" (GS, p. 76). Indeed, ifNietzsche 
had decided to dispense with reason and with the metaphysical 
categories of value that are inevitably congealed in. philosophical 
discourse, he would have ceased writing after his critique of asceti~ 
cism. That is patently not the case. Though I believe Kaufmann 
overestimates Nietzsche's regard for rationality. plenty of textual 
evidence bears out his claim that Nietzsche "proposed to measure 
power and weakness in terms of man's willingness to subject even 
his most cherished beliefs to the rigors of rationality" (Kaufmann, p. 
232). I believe Nietzsche values lOgiC, consistency and reason, but is 
also equally aware of their limitations and is unwilling to assign 
them a superior status in philosophical inquiry. The irrationality 
Nietzsche objects to is revealed in the will to unconditional truth 
which automatically rejects deception, inconsistency and instinct 
and endorses rational consciousness ("their weakest, most fallible 
organ") as the only key to truth (GM, p. 217). 
How, then, might one envision a Nietzsche an reappropriation of 
asceticism that does not fall prey to the Christian-metaphysical 
interpretation? Is it possible that in Nietzsche's writings ideas that 
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take themselves too seriously by denying the absence of transcen­
dental grounding "are themselves released from the ideologies and 
passions that have held them and now lead to thoughts and passions 
that depart from andcontradict the earlier. authoritative structures," 
as Scott asks (GM, p. 211)? First of all, one simply needs to refer back 
to The Genealogy ofMorals to discover how Nietzsche re-interprets 
asceticism for the philosopher who affirms existence. Simply put, 
"[a]sceticismprovides him with the condition most favorable to the 
exercise of his intelligence" (GM, p. 243). Shed of its self-important 
piety, the notion of asceticism for the philosopher is severed from 
concepts of moral scruple. The philosopher who is driven to create 
from an over-abundance of strength does not tame his or her desires 
out of a hatred for the bodybut rather because his or her passions are 
completely channelled into the creative process and thus spiritual­
izedinto a higher level of humanexpression. According to Nietzsche, 
only the weak would be so afraid of their impulses that they would 
seek to eliminate them entirely. Indeed, ifanything, the philosopher 
does not wish to destroy the senses and paSSions but rather to 
sharpen and deepen them in order to intensify the power of the 
philosophical project. 
The priestly form of asceticism, in contrast, aims at the extirpa­
tion of the impulses because it is driven by a hatred of fles.h and 
resentment toward life. The ascetic priest ultimately wIshes to inflict 
suffering. in the form of guilt, upon those who witness his self­
mutilation. and to reinforce the community's adoration of him. The 
affirmative philosopher, on the other hand. views his or her self­
restraint simply as a necessary condition of unrelenting devotion to 
creativity. The philosopher is indifferent to society's assessment of 
himor her; the distress of others which may result from this indiffer­
ence is an inadvertent side-effect, not the primary goal. Thus, philo­
sophical asceticism is stripped of its romantic ostentation and the 
self-aggrandizing righteousness that pollutes theChristianizedf orm. 
Secondly, in seeking a counter-ideal to Christian asceticism, one 
might consider Nietzsche's brief comments about art in The Geneal­
oglJ OfMora Is. Here he makes it clear that the artistic endeavor at least 
approximates an adverse ideal: "As for art ... it is far more radically 
opposed to the ascetic ideal than is science. In art the lie becomes 
consecrated, the will to deception has good conscience at its back" 
(GM,p. 290). Although Nietzsche rejects the artist as too malleable to 
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defend this counter-ideal. this brief passage offers at least a sugges­
tion of what Nietzsche might have been directing us toward. The 
artist aims at deception in that he or she depicts the surface. the 
plastic. the superficial. and lives at the level of externality by employ­
ing images that appeal to the senses rather than trying to plumb the 
depths of reality and ensnare the object of inquiry with a cold, 
conceptual net. Whereas the metaphysician wants to maintain that 
his or her theoretical matrix corresponds directly to in-itself reality, 
the artist entertains no such notions-the artistis aware thatthe mask 
is a mask-and thus has a clear conscience when manipulating 
constructed images. In a sense, then, Nietzsche's own writing is an 
artistic act in that it refers not to an extralinguistic source of validity 
but is authorized performatively and with the reflection of its own 
genealogical configuration. Nietzsche's interrogation of established 
ideals can be construed as an artistic exercise in the sense that he 
analyzes different ways in which a term is masked throughout its 
historical transmutations and at particular historical junctions­
indeed at the very start of the inquiry he announces his intention to 
explore the historical conditions which give rise to moral values 
rather than to probe into the supposed underlying essence of these 
values. Nietzsche does not succumb to the illusion that his analysis 
is independent of masks or that it occupies an objective and neutral 
(rather than perspectival) status. 
At the same time, however, I believe Nietzsche is also driven by 
the will to truth in his genealogical investigation and thus is impli­
cated in a modified version of the ascetic ideal. What is at stake in 
Nietzsche's writings is a kind of truth-seeking that uncovers and 
exposes the blind, restrictive and un-self-critical nature of meta­
physical discourse. It is not that Nietzsche believes that the Christian 
corruption of asceticism conceals and distorts a more fundamental 
truthabout asceticism which will be offered up to us bymeans of the 
genealogical critique. He does not suggest that there exist such 
"correct" definitions. Instead, Nietzsche's ascetic truths consist in 
problematizing the very notion of stable truths. On the other hand, 
Nietzsche does make use of certain descriptive formulations and 
theoretical models (such as the will to power and the eternal recur­
rence) and, though he never systematizes these concepts, he does 
rely on them to an extent that indicates his belief in their applicability 
andvalidity. Thus, he is engaged to a certain extent in a continuation 
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of the ascetic project in one of its unpredicted transformations. 
What alters this ideal inNietzsche's work is, first, the ubiquitous 
movement of self-overcoming that constantly destabilizes the au­
thority of his own position and, secondly. his re-thinking of the 
object of philosophical inquiry. Nietzsche's own hypotheses are 
inspired by the will to truth in that they provide an organizing 
mechanism or serve an explanatory function; at the same time, 
however, they are undercut by Nietzsche's claim that all such 
mechanisms are interpretations shaped by one's perspective and 
thus are exposed as regulatory fictions, models, frames. This strategy 
of self-overcoming or self-revealing frees Nietzsche's inquiry from 
thebadfaith of the Christian ascetic ideal which denies its hermeneu­
tic falsifying and masking. Secondly, Nietzsche re-describes the 
notion of truth and thereby redirects philosophical inquiry. For 
Nietzsche, what renders the will to truth so destructive and life­
negating is its insistence on attaining unconditional truths which can 
be grasped with certainty in an ahistoricized and universalized 
manner. To speak of right or wrong, truth or falsehood per se in 
isolation from a particular context is meaningless. For Nietzsche, the 
concept of truth is continually destabilized by the reinsertion of 
terms into the specific context in which they arise and by the refusal 
of abstract truths. He states, "only that which has no history can be 
defined" (GM, p. 212); thus, since all truth-claims and values evolve 
in a temporal medium and are influenced by the historical situation 
in which they appear, no term, it seems, is definable in any ultimate 
sense. On the other hand, this realization need not abort the truth­
seeking project because this project, reconsidered in the Nietzschean 
manner, does not aim at stable, abiding categories of meaning. The 
truth-object is, for Nietzsche, always in flux, always subject to 
continual reappropriation by various viewpoints, yet this lack of 
fixity does not detract from the affirmative philosopher's project; on 
the contrary, this instability enriches the meaningfulness ofhis or her 
interpretations by allowing for the existence and value of other 
interpretations. Therefore, unlike advocates of the Christian ascetic 
ideal who perceive the revelation of the unstable nature of truth­
claims to constitute an impediment to all further inquiry, the affirma­
tive thinker has enough resilience to absorb this revelation into his or 
her search for conditional truths. This realization does not exempt us 
from philosophizing but instead invites us into a process which is 
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infinitely more challenging, dangerous, life-affinning and fruitful. 
Inconclusion, I believe that one can speak of the possibility of an 
asceticism which springs from an overabundant affirmation of life 
and which avoids slipping into the extremes of either an uncritical 
reverence for truth or an abandonment of the whole truth-seeking 
project. First of all, in the sensual realm, if one's self-restraint is not 
promptedbya self-righteous desire to evoke guilt inothers, involves 
the deepening and sub limating of the passions and combines a spirit 
of levity with a refusal to capitulate to a single established norm, the 
ascetic can embrace life as a whole while transfigurmg certain 
aspects of it. Secondly, if we can avoid baptizing our beliefs as 
"truths" with deadly solemnity and endure the destabilizing move­
ment of questioning in the absence of solutions, this seems to me to 
involve a Nietzschean reformulation of asceticism, an aspiration 
towards the Nietzschean ideal of an "artistic Socrates" in conjoining 
the awareness of the indeterminacy of the theoretical ground on 
whichwe stand witha willingness to commit ourselves passionately 
to our beliefs. This self-reflexive form of asceticism contains the 
strengthboth to confirm that some ideological constructs are mean­
ingfulmsofar as they address humanneeds and to recognize the role 
that convention plays in their construction. The abstractions oflogic 
or the rules of grammar, for instance, may facilitate communication 
and co-existence with other human bemgs, but in certain contexts 
they are certainly notbinding. In the end, Nietzsche does not want us 
to abandon either sensual or intellectual asceticism. The brilliance of 
his reformulated asceticism lies in the fact that it does not compelus 
to eliminate all masks but to realize that we cannot exist without 
them and that a mask which sits before our eyes long enough for us 
to forget it is there must be problematized and historicized until the 
nature ofitsfluidity, contingency, andopen-endedness flows through 
the fissures. 
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